Referendum: The Status Quo is Path Dependent

Carl Baudenbacher wrote in English, so I will respond in English.

In his recent article on ,Vísir, Carl Baudenbacher correctly suggests that there is very real path dependence risk related to the outcome of the upcoming referendum. But he conveniently ignores the existing path dependence. Iceland is not choosing between "a path" and "no path" on 29 August. The status quo is a path, which we've been drifting down for thirty years. It's a path we are dependent on through the EEA agreement -- our currently most important international agreement by far. It guides us towards institutional and organizational ties with the EU without having any real control over how that relationship develops.

The only real question on the ballot is whether we walk a new EU-dependent path with intent, or continue our dependency on an EEA-path we are used to taking for granted.

It's important to understand that a "No" is not a decision to stand still, because standing still simply isn't a possibility. A "No" is a bet that the world of 1994 persists: that the EEA holds while it visibly frays, that the American security umbrella stays open, that international markets stay accessible, and that the next windfall -- Marshall plan, herring, aluminium, banking, tourism, pick one -- arrives when we need it to. Iceland's prosperity since independence has been a sequence of windfalls. In a world rapidly reorganizing into a new political order, betting our future on the indefinite continuation of windfalls isn't prudence, it's a choice to ignore the writing on the wall.

The absence of chosen path dependence isn't the absence of path dependence -- it's the absence of making a choice. The EEA is the most path-dependent arrangement imaginable: continuous adoption of EU law, no seat at the table, no vote, deepening lock-in every single year. If institutional momentum without a democratic mandate keeps Carl Baudenbacher up at night, the EEA should be his nightmare, not the opening of accession talks that end in a second referendum.

In addition, by Baudenbacher's own definition, the cost of switching grows the longer you wait. If the EEA-only path becomes untenable, and the fraying is already visible, Iceland faces this exact choice anyway, except at a later date, with potentially less leverage, in a possibly worse world, and certainly on someone else's timeline.

As a final point, Baudenbacher's talk about a European Union "propaganda machine" is laughable, considering that he is a Swiss man who has worked within EFTA for much of his career, who has now opined more loudly and frequently on the Icelandic referendum than any high level EU representative. Is it conceivable that Iceland potentially joining the EU might have an effect that bothers the Swiss? Either way, any process that generates information, expertise and engagement can be recast as manipulation by someone who doesn't like where it points. If we follow Baudenbacher's standard, a democracy could never investigate anything without being accused of deciding it in advance. But if we have an open dialogue, negotiate, publish the terms, and vote on them, then that is ,already far more democratic scrutiny than the EEA ever received, and infinitely more democratic control than we exercise over the rules we already import.

The author is a former member of Alþingi; Chair of the Icelandic Delegation to the EFTA and EEA Parliamentary Committees 2017-2021.